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FAIRLY SHARING
AFFORDABLE HOUSING OBLIGATIONS:
THE MOUNT LAUREL MATRIX
JOHN

M.

PAYNE*

INTRODUCTION

New Jersey's Mount Laurel doctrine 1 requires every municipal
ity in the state to provide a realistic opportunity for the construc
tion of its fair share of the regional need for low- and moderate
income housing. This doctrine is probably the best known afforda
ble-housing initiative of our time, and without a doubt the most
ambitious judicial ruling in the field of land use controls since
World War II. This Symposium provides a timely reminder, how
ever, that before there was even a trial court decision in the case
that became Mount Laurel I, Massachusetts led the way with chap
ter 774, the Comprehensive Permit Law. 2
My contribution to these thirtieth anniversary proceedings is to
share with you the news from New Jersey. The Mount Laurel doc
trine and the Comprehensive Permit Law are rough contemporaries
and comparisons are therefore in order. I cannot offer anything
that compares to the wealth of specific data that Dean Krefetz
presents in her Article3 because, surprisingly, there has never been
a comprehensive, hard number study of Mount Laurel's results.
Still, the outlines are clear, and I will sketch the general picture with
a concentration on a broader view.
*

Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School - Newark. © 2001 John M. Payne.
S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel 11]; S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel 1].
2. Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, 1969 Mass. Acts 774 (current version
at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1998)). This article will observe the proprieties
and refer to this law by its "grown-up" title. However, I was in law school some miles
east of Springfield in 1969; when chapter 774 was enacted amid controversy. Conse·
quently, the law will always carry for me its cumbersome but wonderfully pointed birth
name, the "Anti-Snob Zoning Law."
3. Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution of the Massachusetts Com
prehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of Experience with a State Leg
islative Effort to Overcome Exclusionary Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. (forth
coming 2001).
1.
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Breaking down exclusionary zoning barriers and encouraging
the provision of low- and moderate-income housing is a tough busi
ness. One of the remarkable things about Mount Laurel as well as
the Comprehensive Permit Law is that both have survived in illib
eral political times for as long as they have. I suspect they have
survived because both the New Jersey and Massachusetts ap
proaches have matured, reaching a level of predictable results and
few surprises in the current political climate which does not support
new initiatives. This is certainly true of New Jersey. In the expecta
tion of better days ahead, however, I propose that we look forward,
beyond the focus of local zoning that is at the core of both the
Mount Laurel doctrine and the Comprehensive Permit Law, to see
what else can be done. Drawing on my New Jersey experiences, I
will present these suggestions within what I call the Mount Laurel
matrix.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MOUNT

LAUREL DOCTRINE.

The Mount Laurel "story" has been discussed at great length in
recent years,4 and so only the briefest recap is necessary to set the
scene here. Although post-war suburban exclusionary policies were
driven by a mixture of race and class fears, in 1975, Southern Bur
lington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel ("Mount
Laurel/") chose the broader focus of income level rather than race,
assuming that solving one problem would solve the other at the
same time. Mount Laurel I also implicitly rejected the Massachu
setts approach, pegging the constitutional obligation to "regional
fair share," rather than to the fixed percentages of chapter 774.
Eight years later, in the face of massive non-compliance,
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
("Mount Laurel II") added a sweeping set of remedies which suc
cessfully forced the issue. Although the court retained the "fair
share" approach of Mount Laurel I, it partially came around to the
Massachusetts model (again, without saying so) to the extent that
the court required each municipality's fair share to be quantified as
a specific number and held that constitutional compliance was to be
measured objectively in terms of whether that numerical goal had
4.

See

M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDA
(1996); DAVID L. KJRP ET AL., OUR ToWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE
SUBURBIA (1995).
CHARLES

CIOUS JUDGES
SOUL OF
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been achieved. s The court also embraced the concept of "inclusion
ary zoning" as a method of compliance for municipalities which
otherwise could not meet their fair share obligations. 6 The court
held that such municipalities must take affirmative steps to satisfy
their obligations. 7 This co-option of the private housing economy
also distinguishes the New Jersey approach from that of the Massa
chusetts approach, which has concentrated on opening the subur
ban door to public and non-profit developments that are totally
occupied by lower-income households.
Mount Laurel II worked as the Supreme Court intended.
Within eighteen months after the Supreme Court announced its
opinion, specially-assigned trial judges worked out a formula for
calculating fair shares. 8 Shortly thereafter, individual municipalities
began getting the bad news about specific court-ordered changes in
their land use plans. With the handwriting on the wall, the legisla
ture entered the fray with the New Jersey Fair Housing Act of
1985.9 This Act created a Council on Affordable Housing
("COAH"),l0 to administer a new system of nominally voluntary
compliance, backed up by a presumption that municipalities with
affordable housing plans certified by COAH would be relieved of
litigation in Superior CourtY COAH, by administrative rulemak
ing, left the court-developed procedures for calculating fair share
largely intact,12 but by careful attention to detail, it was able to
drastically reduce the estimated need for low- and moderate-in
come units. Doing so lowered fair share numbers significantly for
many communities, thus fulfilling one of the unstated purposes of
COAH.13
COAH also administers a system known as Regional Contribu
tion Agreements ("RCAs"), which permits suburban municipalities
to satisfy up to 50% of their fair share obligation by funding afford
5.

See Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, at 421-22.
Id. at 446-49.
7. See id. at 447-48.
8. AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 504 A.2d 692, 696-704 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1984).
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000) (enacted July
2, 1985).
10. Id. § 52:27D-305.
11. See id. § 52:27D-317.
12. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 93 (1999) (setting forth the COAH fair share
rules in their current form).
13. See John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of Af
fordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20, 29-30 (1987) (explaining how the fair
share numbers were lowered).
6.
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able housing in urban areas.14 Mount Laurel II did not address
RCAs, and though they are segregative in intent and effect, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has avoided the opportunity to declare
them invalid. 15 The inclusion of RCAs in the Mount Laurel process
mandated by the legislature underscores with deep irony the deci
sion made by the court in 1975 not to address the problem of exclu
sionary zoning as a racial issue. 16
II.

WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED?

There has been no comprehensive study of the results achieved
by the Mount Laurel doctrine, but several partial surveys, coupled
with the informed assessment of affordable-housing advocates in
New Jersey, yield a reasonably accurate pictureP Since 1985, ap
proximately 15,000 to 20,000 publicly-funded units of affordable
low- and moderate-income housing units have been created; this
compares favorably with the rate of creation in the heyday of the
public-housing program prior to 1985. 18 A largely unintended by
product of the creation of Mount Laurel housing has been the crea
tion of a substantial amount of middle-income housing in suburban
areas, consisting of market-rate units in inclusionary developments
that would not have been permitted by the municipality but for the
Mount Laurel obligation.1 9 In addition, close to $120 million has
been infused into urban areas. 20 At the present time, the RCA
funds constitute the largest single source of housing subsidy money
in New Jersey.
14.

See § 52:27D-312.
See In re Township of Warren, 622 A.2d 1257, 1269 (N.J. 1993) (disposing of
the issue on other grounds).
16. See John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges and the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1685, 1707-09 (1998) (reviewing HAAR, supra note 4 and discussing the race issue).
17. See generally John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning and the
Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REv. 665 (1996). A
more recent study focused on the characteristics of the occupants of the Mount Laurel
units, rather than the number of units created. See Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eis
dorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Characteristics of
Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268 (1997).
18. COAH's website claims 23,100 Mount Laurel units have been built or are
under construction. The Council on Affordable Housing, at http://www.state.nj.us/dca/
coah.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2000). COAH's monitoring capacity is limited by its
very small staff, however, and its counts tend to be a bit optimistic. See Payne, supra
note 17, at 672.
19. See Martha Lamar et aI., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New
Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1197, 1260 (1989).
20. See The Council on Affordable Housing, supra note 18. The Council reports
some 6300 RCA units financed with these funds. See id.
15.
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Most privately-developed Mount Laurel units are offered for
sale, rather than as rentals, especially those occupied by families.
Public subsidies are still available for senior citizen developments,
which are often in rental form as a result. Mount Laurel units are
occupied almost exclusively by non-minority families who previ
ously lived in the suburbs fairly close to the inclusionary develop
ment site. Very few households earning less than 40% of the
median income have benefited from Mount Laurel. One recent
study even noted that some minority households (but no non-mi
nority ones) moved from a suburban area to an urban Mount Lau
rel unit,21

III.

THE MOUNT LAUREL MATRIX.

An important distinction between New Jersey's affordable
housing history and that of both Massachusetts and Connecticut is
the key role that the New Jersey Supreme Court played in both
putting the process into effect and keeping it going. It is this judi
cial involvement that accounts for the degree of success that the
Mount Laurel doctrine has enjoyed, for there can be no doubt that
the legislature would have abandoned the fair share process alto
gether had it been constitutionally permissible to do so.
But if judicial involvement is the source of our success, it is
also, in the perverse way that so often affects law reform litigation,
the source of our failure as well. Court-mandated housing policies
lack even the slender political legitimacy that the New England
statutes can claim, and without political legitimacy, a process that
directly affects so many people and policies in so many ways cannot
be self-sustaining. Thus, in recent years, I have tried to puzzle out
an approach to housing opportunity that preserves the benefits of
judicial enforcement while correcting some of its flaws.
As a threshold matter, any judicially-based housing strategy
must note well the source of the legal obligation. Mount Laurel I's
"general welfare" theory was straightforward, but in 1975 it could
stretch only far enough to require the elimination of barriers to af
fordable housing. When Mount Laurel II went beyond exclusion
ary zoning and required that local governments use their power
affirmatively to facilitate the provision of affordable housing, some
thing more was required doctrinally. It would have been conve
nient if that "something" had been the court's recognition of a
21.

See Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 17, at 1296.
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constitutional entitlement requiring the government to be the pro
vider of last resort for at least a minimum of human shelter needs,
but the New Jersey Supreme Court conspicuously refused to state
that such a right exists. Thus, we are left to infer what the "miss
ing" constitutional right that lends support to the judicially-based
obligation to act might be. 22
Although this essay is not the place for an extended explora
tion of constitutional arguments, I believe that the Mount Laurel
cases can be interpreted as standing for the "can do" principle
that governments should do all that they can do, within reasonable
limits of governmental capacity, to facilitate provision of shelter for
those who need it. This hypothesis is implied by the "general wel
fare" doctrine that underlies Mount Laurel I, and it is completely
consistent with the court's embrace of inclusionary zoning in Mount
Laurel II as something within the power of local governments. In
clusionary zoning, after all, requires nothing more than the combi
nation of two standard zoning techniques-density regulation and
use regulation. 23
Viewed through the lens of the "can do" principle, it becomes
immediately apparent that different levels of government have the
power to accomplish different things in different contexts without a
court having to hold governmental actors to a standard beyond
their constitutional capacity and without the court transgressing its
own limits. Considered this way, the Mount Laurel doctrine is not
about inclusionary developments, or subsidized housing, or any spe
cific remedy for that matter. Rather, it is about the entire basket of
remedies that the creative human mind can comprehend.
Thus reinterpreted, a revised and expanded Mount Laurel doc
trine can be described as a matrix, as opposed to a linear solution to
the problem of affordable housing. As a first attempt to represent
the matrix (I will modify it later), we can locate on one axis the
major institutions of government involved in providing housing op
portunities, and on the other axis, techniques for implementing af
fordable-housing strategies. There are two cells on each axis: state
government and local government on the "institutional" axis, and
22. See, e.g., John M. Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount
Laurel II, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 555, 555-56 (2000) (presenting a preliminary case
for the existence of a constitutional right to shelter within the logic of the second Mount
Laurel opinion).
23. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-65(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 2000) (use);
id. § 40:55D-65(c) (density); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.01 (4th ed.,
Lexis 1997).
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regulatory techniques and subsidy techniques on the "implementa
tion" axis. Thus, the matrix produces four possible combinations:
(1) state regulation; (2) state subsidies; (3) local regulation; and (4)
local subsidies. This can be rendered graphically:
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
TECHNIQUE
STATE
Regulation
State regulation [Example:
N.J. Fair Housing Act of
1985]

Subsidy

State subsidy [Example:
low interest loans for first
time home buyers]

MUNICIPALITY
Local Regulation
[Example: inclusionary
zoning ordinance]
Local subsidy [Example:
donation of surplus land
to non-profit housing
developer]

By definition, the Mount Laurel doctrine, and hence Mount
Laurel compliance, applies to public entities but not to private de
velopers because public entities are bound by the state constitu
tional obligation to serve the general welfare. 24 Private developers,
important as they are to the Mount Laurel compliance process,
have no direct constitutional obligation under either Mount Laurel
case. The general welfare restraint, as applied through the Mount
Laurel doctrine, is an element of the police power, which only gov
ernment can possess. Since the state constitution cannot bind the
federal government, whose constitution apparently does not extend
as far as New Jersey's,25 we are limited to considering only the state
and its subdivisions.
In principle, we could further say that the Mount Laurel doc
trine applies only to the state itself (reversing, in effect, the current
compliance regime) because the police power, and hence the gen
eral welfare obligation, is an attribute of sovereignty, which the
state alone possesses. But, as a practical matter, the state's sover
eign power to regulate the use of land is so frequently and thor
oughly passed through to the local level of government (a
delegation that is unlikely to be reversed anytime soon) that it
makes sense to treat local governments as a distinct entity for pur
poses of constructing a practical and effective approach to Mount
24. See Mount Laurel I, supra note 1, at 725.
25. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (stating that the federal consti
tution does not mandate adequate housing).
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Laurel compliance. Agencies of the state, such as the New Jersey
Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency, and sub-units of the state,
such as counties, are also equally relevant. However, since these
agencies and sub-units are sufficiently subject to direct state con
trol, it is possible to speak of "the state" as a generic institution for
simplicity of analysis.
Having thus defined the categories, it is nonetheless important
to keep in mind that this mode of classification is a matter of analyt
ical convenience, not one of constitutional dimension. Specifically,
this means that the state is not free to cast local governments adrift
to comply with the Mount Laurel doctrine or not as their local incli
nations dictate subject to being "caught" by the state courts only if
successful litigation is brought. 26 Nevertheless, the state has, in ef
fect, cast local governments adrift throughout the Mount Laurel era
subject only to the oversight of state courts during litigation. 27 As
will be seen, significant aspects of the methodology I propose turn
on the primacy of the state's Mount Laurel obligation. Thus, the
state and its local subdivisions form one axis of the matrix.
Turning to the other axis, there are, broadly speaking, two
types of power that either the state or local government can bring
to bear on Mount Laurel compliance: the power to regulate private
activities and the power to raise or spend public resources. Both
state and local governments can regulate the activities of the private
and semi-private housing market to socially useful ends. Under
current regimes of land use policy, however, the heavy lifting of
land use regulation is left to the local rather than to the state level,
which explains why the Mount Laurel compliance system is based
on inclusionary zoning-a type of local regulation.
By placing inclusionary zoning within the more complex matrix
I have described, it becomes apparent that Mount Laurel compli
ance need not be limited to this technique alone. As a result, I
would argue that it is not appropriate for COAH to base its fair
share calculations and compliance review procedures primarily on
the premise that inclusionary zoning is the primary goal of the pro
cess. 28 Local governments have other regulatory techniques availa
26. See In re Egg Harbor Assocs., 464 A.2d 1115, 1122 (N.J. 1983) (recognizing
that "local [zoning] decisions 'must be consistent with statewide policies"') (quoting
Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, 430 A.2d 881, 886 (N.J. 1981».
27. See, e.g., Lusardi, 430 A.2d at 887 (striking down a local zoning ordinance
which conflicted with state priorities).
28. For instance, COAH essentially excuses municipal compliance to the extent
that the municipality lacks "developable land" for inclusionary developments, without
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ble to them. For instance, rent control is a potentially useful
technique in older suburbs where inc1usionary zoning usually does
not work well because of the lack of large development sites. Addi
tionally, as I have indicated, the state has not only its own regula
tory powers but also plenary control over the delegation of
regulatory power to local governments. There is much to be ex
plored here under the "can do" principle.
Both state and local governments can also directly subsidize
needed housing by building it themselves, by providing cash subsi
dies to others to build it, or through direct subsidies to households
to pay for it. Closely related to this spending power is the power to
participate in available direct subsidy programs offered by higher
units of government-most notably those of the federal govern
ment. This kind of local, state, and federal cooperation regarding
public-housing programs (direct subsidy) was very much at the
heart of the court's expectations in the early 1970s regarding how
Mount Laurel would be implemented. 29
IV.

PRIVATE SHARES AND PUBLIC SHARES

A new approach to Mount Laurel compliance can be formal
ized by establishing a two-tier system of constitutional fair share
obligations: one a "private share," recognizing the capacity of pri
vate markets to meet low- and moderate-income housing needs if
regulated in the general interest, and the other a "public share,"
recognizing the resource capacities that are uniquely governmental.
In keeping with the matrix model, we must separately examine the
extent to which each type of share, private and public, can be imple
mented by the state itself and by each municipality acting under
appropriate state supervision. The present practice of calculating a
single "fair share" obscures the extent of a government's collective
ability to meet shelter needs. Instead, we should list separately the
public and private strands of "fair share" and require that they be
met separately (although not necessarily as a numerical obligation
in every instance).
In essence, the two-tier system already exists, albeit only parrequiring inquiry into alternative modes of compliance. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5,
§ 93-4.1, -4.2(d) (1999).
29. See Mount Laurel I, supra note 1, at 734 ("We have in mind that there is at
least a moral obligation in a municipality to establish a local housing agency pursuant to
state law to provide housing for its resident poor now living in dilapidated, unhealthy
quarters."); cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311(a)(7) (West 1986 & Supp. 2000) (author
izing the use of federal or state subsidies for Mount Laurel compliance purposes).
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tially and in a very chaotic form. The Mount Laurel doctrine has
concerned itself almost exclusively with one cell of the matrix-pri
vate market regulatory strategies at the local level, over-emphasiz
ing inclusionary zoning. Where voluntary compliance has not been
forthcoming, the New Jersey courts have been willing to mandate
this one form of local regulatory effort. However, inclusionary zon
ing is not an end in itself; it is only one example of how a local
government can use its regulatory power if local governments have
a judicially-enforceable constitutional obligation to do as much as
they can. Consider some of the other market regulation techniques
that might easily be required as part of a Mount Laurel compliance
program: rent control laws, anti-gentrification laws, restrictions on
condominium conversions, and zoning for "mobile" homes. 3D All
have the effect of either facilitating a low-cost housing market or
preventing the tendency of the market to gravitate towards higher
income uses. 31
In addition to these "private share" regulatory techniques,
even at present, a local "public share" can occasionally be added in
the form of direct or indirect housing subsidies, but only if the mu
nicipality offers to provide them on a voluntary basis. Typically, the
public share is in the form of money raised to fund RCAs, but other
kinds of funding, such as municipal donation of surplus land to help
write down the cost of a development, are also used. 32 Guided er
roneously by Mount Laurel II, courts have never seen it as their
role to order these kinds of "public" shares; therefore, public funds
have sometimes been injected into private inclusionary develop
ments to reduce the developer's cost,33 rather than to make the
homes available to more or poorer households than could be served
by private development alone. Under the Mount Laurel doctrine,
public funds should leverage, not take the place of, private effort.
30. See Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, at 450 (endorsing zoning for mobile
homes).
31. COAH identifies a further list of local initiatives, although they are less ag
gressive than the ones given in the text of the Mount Laurel compliance program (e.g.,
group homes and accessory apartments). See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 93-5.8 to 5.12.
Housing advocates tend to frown on these COAH-suggested alternatives, because they
do not address the core need to provide opportunities for families with children, but
this lack of enthusiasm would diminish if there were a broader range of solutions being
pursued simultaneously, as proposed by the matrix model.
32. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311(a)(5) to (a)(8); N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 5, § 93-5.5, 5.7 (municipal contributions).
33. See, e.g., Lamar et aI., supra note 19, at 1242 (providing an example of a low
income development program which gave its money to lenders who had special lending
relationships with developers).
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Beyond this, the cells in the proposed matrix are conceptually
empty under current interpretations of the Mount Laurel doctrine
and the state Fair Housing Act. Even if we assume that local zon
ing will constitute the lion's share of land use regulation, thus
shrinking the possibility for a state level "private share," a "can do"
reading of the Mount Laurel doctrine dictates that the state require
all municipalities to prepare and submit fair share plans to COAH,
rather than, as at present, leaving compliance voluntary. COAH
participation data shows that 128 of New Jersey's 567 municipalities
were in compliance in August 1999.34 This strongly suggests that
the incentives for voluntary participation are much too weak to be
constitutionally adequate.
However, the assumption that there is local control is far from
completely accurate. For instance, states are increasingly imposing
direct regulation (or regulatory oversight) in critical areas such as
environmentally-sensitive coastal zones. 35 No systematic attention
has been paid to the use of indusionary zoning (or other lower
income housing techniques) in these areas and no decisions require
(as opposed to permit) such activities, even though the "realistic
opportunities" are large and obvious. 36 Moreover, the state's deci
sions about the provision of crucial water and sewer infrastructure
and road access to major developments certainly determine where
and when development can occur; like an increasing number of
states, New Jersey now embodies its infrastructure policies in a
state master plan, to which Mount Laurel criteria have already been
joined.37 Still, enforcement is lacking. The state also regulates con
dominium conversions, without considering the impact that "going
condo" has on poor residents in gentrifying communities. 38
34. See Payne, supra note 17, at 676-77; 128 Municipalities Have COAH's Ap
proval, NEWSL. (N.J. Council on Affordable Hous.), Aug. 1999, at 2, available at http://
www.state.nj.us/dca/coahlarchive.htm. Many of these "certified" municipalities have
very small fair shares, zero in some cases, thus underscoring the weak level of actual
compliance.
35. See, e.g., In re Egg Harbor Assocs., 464 A.2d 1115, 1116-17 (N.J. 1983).
36. Id. at 1122 (holding that a state agency may require inclusionary zoning). The
context of the case did not require consideration of the agency's obligation to require
inclusionary zoning however.
37. N.J. STATE PLANNING COMM'N, COMMUNITIES OF PLACE: THE NEW JERSEY
STATE DEVELOPMENT AND REDEVELOPMENT PLAN (June 17, 1992) (SDRP); id.
§ IV(B)(8), Policy 17 (indicating coordination with Council on Affordable Housing).
Not surprisingly, however, the SDRP contrives not to utter the dread phrase "Mount
Laurel" in its section on housing.
38. See Comm. for Hous. Alternatives, Inc. v. Mayor of Jersey City (unpublished
opinion), cert. denied, 570 A.2d 963 (N.J. 1989) (ruling that the City's attempt to regu
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The potential is even more dramatic if one considers the possi
bility of a state-level "public share," i.e., an obligation on the part of
the state to finance affordable-housing production. The reason that
presumably led the Mount Laurel court to forgo imposing financial
obligations on municipalities applies with much less force at the
state level. Local governments, heavily dependent on property tax
revenues, cannot realistically be expected to devote substantial
sums to social welfare programs. However, the state, with a budget
in the billions and with access to elastic revenue sources such as an
income tax, is already heavily invested in welfare spending and can
not plausibly avoid review of the way in which it discharges its
responsibilities.
Even putting aside for the moment the particularly knotty
question of whether a court can or should order new state spending
on shelter needs, there is much that could be done within existing
programs that the state already undertakes voluntarily by more rig
orous means-testing. For instance, the New Jersey Housing and
Mortgage Finance Agency establishes a threshold income eligibility
level for a variety of assisted-housing programs that is not only in
excess of the Mount Laurel ceiling of 80% of regional median in
come, but in excess of median income altogether. 39 This reflects the
political popularity of directing aid to middle-class voters.
With less boldness than was asked of the two Mount Laurel
courts, a court today, guided by the "can do" principle and the
Mount Laurel matrix, could readily hold that the middle-class skew
in eligibility limits for these otherwise beneficial housing programs
is unconstitutional by analogizing it to the unconstitutional skewing
of the land use power found in exclusionary zoning. If the state
were then given the choice of targeting a substantial portion of aid
to the most needy households, those who are too poor to be served
by the market mechanisms of inclusionary zoning alone, it is a fair
late price of rental units converted to condominium status was preempted by state con
dominium conversion law).
39. In April, 1999, New Jersey median income measured in three- or four-county
regions ranged between a low of $43,950 and a high of $69,030 for a family of three, and
COAH's 80%/50% ceilings for moderate- and low-income eligibility, respectively, ac
cordingly ranged between $35,160/21,975 and $55,224/34,515. 1999 Regional Income
Limits, NEWSL. (N.J. Council on Affordable Hous.), Apr. 1999, at 2 available at http://
www.state.nj.us/dca/coahlarchive.htm. In July, 2000, HMFA's web page gave income
eligibility limits between $66,600 and $92,920 for a variety of assisted programs that are
described elsewhere on the website. See HFMA Home Buyer Mortgage Program: 2000
Income Limits at http://www.state.nj.us/dcalhmfa/singfarnlinc_prch.html (last visited
July 23, 2000).
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bet that the legislature would choose to do so rather than shutting
the programs down altogether. 40 Note that, carefully crafted, the
hypothetical judicial ruling I suggest need not cost the state a dime
more than it presently appropriates.
In theory, and perhaps in practice, this matrix approach could
be expanded to distinguish different components of housing need
determining a "private share" and a "public share" to satisfy each
government's obligation to address distinct housing problems, such
as substandard housing, cost-burdened households (those living in
safe, sanitary housing but paying too high a portion of their income
for the "privilege"), and homelessness. Doing so would illustrate
that different compliance techniques, at different levels of govern
ment, may be best suited to particular types of problems. Substan
dard housing, for instance, invites a greater emphasis on new
construction solutions, such as inclusionary zoning, than does cost
burdensomeness, and homelessness might require financial solu
tions that are largely, if not exclusively, within the capacity of state
rather than local government.
Such a detailed, expanded matrix, however, is beyond the
scope of this essay. In fact, we may finally conclude it is neither
necessary nor desirable to expand the matrix. One of the lessons of
the Mount Laurel story is the risk of methodological hubris. As an
attorney for one Mount Laurel plaintiffs' organization in the years
immediately after Mount Laurel II, I participated in the develop
ment of the original fair share formula. 41 It was both a professional
challenge and a great deal of fun to be there, but it is difficult to
make policy by formula. By contrast, one of the advantages of the
Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit approach is its methodologi
cal simplicity. To construct every cell of a complex housing needs
matrix and fill each cell with exquisitely tailored a priori solutions is
to risk replicating on a larger scale the error which has led New
Jersey to focus solely on inclusionary zoning and miss the bigger
picture. My central purpose is to suggest an approach to fair share
40. To give an egregious example, when the state's construction industry was in a
serious recession in 1992, the legislature obligingly appropriated $200 million in con
struction subsidies in what was called the Housing Incentive Finance Act, commonly
called the "Fix the Hammer" Bill. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14K-45 to -63 (West Supp.
2000). The Act expressly provided that in assisting developments, "no constraints may
be placed on the marketing or pricing policy of a qualified housing developer." Id.
§ 55:14K-50(d).
41. See AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 504 A.2d 692, 694 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1984) (using the fair share formula to determine whether the municipal
ordinance "fully complies with Mount Laure!").
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compliance that is more effective than the one currently em
ployed-one that emphasizes the realistic capacity of government
to address a broader array of housing needs with a greater selection
of compliance techniques. If a more complex expression of this ap
proach ultimately proves useful, it will be more sound to build it
piece by piece, after the basics of the private share/public share con
cepts have become better established.
To summarize, we can restate the matrix, substituting the labels
"private share" and "public share" for "regulation" and "subsidy,"
respectively, with an expanded set of examples which are nonethe
less illustrative rather than complete. The shift to "private share"
and "public share" labels that are not themselves compliance tech
niques is intended to emphasize the idea behind the label in hopes
that useful solutions like "regulation" or "subsidy" do not become
ends in themselves as inc1usionary zoning has.
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
STATE
"Private" N.J. Fair Housing Act of
1985
Share
(make compliance
mandatory)
Critical area zoning
Infrastructure regulations
Enforce SDRP policies
Revise condominium laws
"Public" Means-test existing programs
Share
Require local participation in
existing subsidy programs
Prepare shelter plan
Expand direct subsidies?

V.

MUNICIPALITY
Inclusionary zoning
Rent control
Condo conversion controls
Mobile/modular home zones
(N.J.A.C. 5:93-5.8 to -5.12)

RCA funding
Donate surplus land
Waive fees/exactions
Housing authority
Purchase vacant units

IMPLEMENTING THE MOUNT LAUREL MATRIX

It remains to be considered, however, how "private shares"

and "public shares" would be calculated, since some norm is neces
sary if they are to be implemented by a court. As I have already
suggested, the current fair share/inclusionary zoning regime func
tions de facto as a "private share" methodology at the local level,
although an unnecessarily narrow one. I have elsewhere argued
that an alternative approach, called "growth share," would be pref
erable because it would minimize the problems of "bad politics"
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and "bad planning" that burden the current formulaic approach to
fair share in New Jersey.42 "Growth share" is also a logical compo
nent of the matrix approach in that it would encourage a search for
compliance solutions that do not depend solely on new construction
inclusionary developments. "Growth share" requires further elabo
ration to be made workable, but for present purposes we need only
realize that the "private/local" cell of the matrix can be filled with
more than inclusionary zoning and that, however it is filled, inquiry
about the full range of Mount Laurel compliance possibilities reach
beyond that cell.
As to the parallel "private" regulatory share that might be as
signed to the state government as part of its newly recognized
Mount Laurel obligation, I am inclined to leave that to ad hoc de
termination as specific issues arise, in part because most land use
regulation occurs at the local level and also because the concept of
"share" is relatively inapposite when the state as a whole is consid
ered; ultimately, the state's share is 100% of the need. Mount Lau
rel I required the elimination of unnecessary, cost-generating fea
tures in local ordinances,43 state statutes, and regulations. Like
wise, practices that have adverse afford ability consequences should
also be subject to judicial review (without a presumption of consti
tutionality) on a case-by-case basis. One such provision clearly
would be the "voluntariness" provision in the 1985 Fair Housing
Act.44
The real challenge is to find a useful concept of "public
shares," which will amount to a judicially-enforceable obligation to
subsidize affordable housing. Here, for fiscal capacity reasons, it
will be much more meaningful to concentrate our attention on the
state's obligations, rather than the municipalities' obligations. As
suming that the state's "public share" obligation has been deter
mined, it may suffice to require as the local "public share" that
municipalities cooperate with all applicable state, and federal
programs.

42. See John M. Payne, Remedies for Affordable Housing: From Fair Share to
Growth Share, 49 LAND USE & ZONING DIG. No.6, at 3-9 (June 1997).
43. See Mount Laurel I, supra note 1, at 731-32 (noting that certain local zoning
restrictions made it unrealistic for low-and moderate-income families to live in the
Mount Laurel area).
44. See Comm. for Hous. Alternatives, Inc. v. Mayor of Jersey City (unpublished
opinion), cert. denied., 570 A.2d 963 (N.J. 1989).
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CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, the most controversial part of my proposed
Mount Laurel matrix approach is my suggestion that courts man
date access to the state's fiscal resources to resolve problems of
housing afford ability. For present purposes, I concede that the judi
cial process and separation of powers problems that inhere in or
dering the state to pay a judicially-determined sum of money are
significant enough that this should not be the first initiative upon
implementing the Mount Laurel matrix, although there is more to
be said at some later date about that intriguing question. It is not
necessary to go that far. As I have suggested above,45 there are
substantial opportunities to simply require the state to keep its pri
orities straight within assistance programs that the legislature sees
fit to fund.
"Make no little plans." I surely do not expect to see my four
part matrix adopted tomorrow in New Jersey or anywhere else.
Keeping it in mind, however, we can discern more dearly how the
Mount Laurel doctrine could reach its full potential. Perhaps those
who gathered for this Symposium, in the spirit of those who dared
in 1969 to propose the Comprehensive Permit Law, might be able
to take the next steps toward that unimaginably bold goal-fair
housing for all.

45. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
suggestions.

